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mission and Cvabbu  thought acccss to a highway was a benefit 
to a person or his estate and even thought there was an advantage 
gained by proximitv.
John W . Turnbull,
II Law, U .N .B.
BAILEES — POW ER OF SALE — LIENS — SECTIONS 
5 9, LIENS ON GOODS AND CHATTELS ACT — R.S.C. 
ORD. 50, R. 2.
T h e  purpose of this note is to discuss certain defects in the 
law regarding the rights of bailees to sell bailed property. T he 
facts of Sachs v. Miklos1 provide a convenient point o f  departure. 
In 1940 the defendant consented to store in her house furniture 
belonging to the plaintiff without making any charge for the 
servicc. fn 1943 the defendant required the room in which the 
furniture was stored. She obtained from the plaintiff’s bank 
manager an address where he might be found, wrote to him twice 
and attempted more than once to communicate with him by 
telephone. T h e letters having been returned to her, she sent the 
furniture to the second defendants, a firm of auctioneers, who 
sold it for CIS. In 1946 the plaintiff demanded the return of his 
furniture and then brought action. T h e  defendants, the bailee 
and the auctioneers, were both found liable in conversion be­
cause they were found not to be agents of necessity, since there 
was no emergency and the goods were not perishable.
At common law a bailee’s power of sale was restricted to 
situations of necessity and possibly only to carriers. Further, the 
power was limited to perishable goods and could only be exercised 
in the best interests of the owner, not of the bailee. In addition 
a real necessity had to exist for the sale and it had to be prac­
tically (commercially) impossible to get the owner’s instructions 
in time as to what should be done.2
Rccent statutes, however, have made provision giving powers 
of sale to certain bailees. Examples are the Inn-Keepers Act3 and 
the W arehousem an’s Lien Act.4 T h e Liens on Goods and C hat­
tels Act'’ contains more general provisions. It  first gives a lien to 
persons who have done work on chattels, jewellers, wharfingers 
and gratuitous bailees, and then provides a power of sale for these 
persons. T h e lien of the gratuitous bailee and the power of sale
1». ( I ‘M(i) 37 O .L .R . 636.
1. [1948] 2 K.R. 43.
2. Sims v. M idland Ily. [1913] I K.B. 103: f«»1 a discussion of agency of 
necessity, see Cheshire and Fifoot. T h e  Law of Contract (I9.16), 4th ed.. 
pp. 387-8.
3. R .S.N .B., 1952. c. I I I .  s. 2.
4. R .S.N .B., 19:72, c. 247. s. 4.
f). R .S.N .B., 19.12. c. 131. ss. 2. 3. 4. ;’> and 9.
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require more detailed discussion. T h e problem concerning the 
power of sale affects other bailees given liens under the Act, but 
for simplicity it will be dealt with only in connection with 
gratuitous bailees.
Section 5(1) of the Act reads as follows:
A gratuitous bailee of goods shall have a particular lien on the 
same for his reasonable charges for caring for them after the 
expiration of the time mentioned in a notice given by him to 
the bailor to take possession of the goods.
Section 5(2) gives a judge power to dispense with the notice if 
the bailor’s address or wnereabouts is unknown. After the bailee 
has acquired a lien under section 5, section 9(1) gives him a right 
of sale. It provides that if the goods are not taken away by the 
bailor pursuant to section 4 (here section 5 is obviously intended) 
then,
. . . the lien holder may give notice to the debtor by registered 
post or personal service, specifying a reasonable time and place 
for payment, the amount owing and the property detained, and 
stating that in default of payment an application will be made 
to a judge at a time and place to be mentioned therein for 
leave to sell such goods.
If, however, the lien was acquired because notice was dispensed 
with under section 5(2) owing to the bailor’s absence, it will also 
be necessary to dispense with the notice in section 9(1). U nfor­
tunately there is no express provision in the Act to enable a judge 
to dispense with the notice required by section 9(1). Therefore, 
it wodld appear that the bailee, although endowed with a statu­
tory lien under section 5, only has a passive right of retention if 
the bailor cannot be found.
It might be argued that a judge on hearing an application 
for leave to sell the goods pursuant to section 9 has the implied 
power under section 9(3) to dispense with the notice required by 
section 9(1). Section 9(3) reads as follows:
On the hearing of the application the judge may make such 
order as he deems just.
It is submitted, however, that notice is a condition precedent to 
the use of section 9(3).
Another answer to the problem might be found in section 23 
of the Interpretation A ct,6 which provides that where an enact­
ment authorizes or requires a document to be served or deliver­
ed by post, then, unless the contrary is proved, service or delivery 
is deemed to have been afforded at the tim e at which the letter 
wouid be delivered in the ordinary course of post. B u t section 23
6. R .S.N .B., 19')2, c. 114.
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of the Interpretation Act speaks of “pioperlv addressing” sucli 
letters. It is submitted that these words presuppose a definite 
knowledge of the person’s whereabouts ana so render the section 
useless in interpreting section 9(1) of the Liens on Goods and 
Chattels Act.
It may also be argued that the noticc required bv section 9(1) 
of the Liens on Goods and Chattels Act max be served under 
Order 67, rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. T h at rule 
reads as follows:
(i. W here personal sen ice of an\ writ, nolice, pleading, sum ­
mons, order, or other docum ent. proceeding, or written com ­
munication is required In these Rules or otherwise, and it is 
made to appear to the Court or a Judge that prompt personal 
service cannot he effected, the Court or Judge may make such 
order for substituted or other service, or fur the substitution of 
notice for service by letter, public advertisement, or otherwise, 
as may be just.
It is submitted, however, that if the notice required by section 
9(1) could be deemed to be served under this rule, then the 
power to dispense with the notice required bv section 5 of the 
Act would be superfluous. Since the Legislature should not be 
deemed to intend a superfluity, it would appear that there has been 
an intentional omission to cnact an express power enabling a judge 
to dispense with the notice required bv section 9(1 )—expressio 
unitis, exclusio alter ins.
If, as has been suggested in the foregoing, section 9 of the 
Liens on Goods and Chattels Act does not provide a com ­
prehensive power of sale for a bailee where the bailor cannot be 
found, then conceivably the bailee might rclv on Order 50, rule
2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court to dispose of the goods. 
T h at rule reads as follow s:
T h e  Court or a Judge, upon the application of any party, may 
make an order for the sale, by any person or persons named 
in such order, and in such manner, and on such terms as the 
Court or Judge may think desirable, of any goods, wares, or 
merchandise which may be of a perishable nature, or likely 
to in jure for keeping, which for any other just and sufficient 
reason it may be desirable to have sold at once.
l he cases on the rule arc few; it 1 - - - 1 ' M £— Ll ^
sale of non-perishable goods, the courts have held that they are 
empowered to order a sale irrespective of the rights of the parties/* 
but it has been noted that “T n e rule ought to be construed with 
a verv tender regard to the persons in whom the legal property
sale of perishable goods.7 W hen
7. Note that the Liens on Goods and Chattels Act. R .S.X .B .. 1‘i.VJ. c. Ifll 
s. 8 (2) also provides for the sale of perishable goods.
8. L am er  »». Fawcett [19">(l] 2 All F..R. 727.
is vested.”“ T he rule’s most common use occurs in actions where 
neither party’s interest would be adversely affected by the dis­
position of the goods concerned. For example, in Bartholomew 
v. Freeman,10 the subject matter was a horse of no exceptional 
value that neither party wanted and whose upkeep was costly to 
the person seeking the order for sale. In this case, Grove, J. said:
T h e  case comes sufficiently within the final clause of Order 
1.11., Rule 2. T h ere seems “just and sufficient reason” why it 
may be desirable to  have the animal sold at once. I certainly 
should not make such an order if the horse were a valuable 
one for which either party particularly cared. But here neither 
of them values it per se nor wishes to keep i t .l l
And Singleton, L. J., in Lam er v. Fawcett,1'2said:
. . . but, in view of (the owner’s) obvious reluctance to take 
any step to recover the filly, I think it would lie deplorable 
if this court . . . having the power, . . . did not exercise it. •
Evans v. Davies™ where an order was made for the sale of shares 
in a limited company, indicates that the rule can be invoked for 
the sale of any type of chattel, provided, of course, that the cir­
cumstances of the application are sufficient to satisfy the rule.
T h e Annual P ractice '4 cites Dawn v. Herring,15 as authority 
(or the statement that an application under Order 50, rule 2, 
should not be made ex parte. A review of several reports of that 
case has revealed no basis for the statement in T h e  Annual Prac- 
ticc, but whether or not the statement is authoritative, it should 
be noted that it is merely directive, not mandatory. If it is found, 
however, that an application under Order 50, rule 2, cannot be 
made ex parte, then if the address or whereabouts of the bailor 
is unknown, a solution in accordance with The Hercules'" might 
be available. In that case there was a motion by the plaintiff for 
the appraisement and sale of a vessel. T h e  plaintiffs had begun 
an action in rem against T h e Hercules for carnage by collision, 
but no appearance was made. Butt, J. said:
1 cannot grant an application to sell a foreign ship on such 
m aterials as arc at present before me. But I will make the 
recpiired order, subject to the p lain tiff’s filing an affidavit in 
the registry verifying their cause of action, and stating also
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0. Dflifgrt* V. (¡os ¡tel Ouk Iron Co. (1890) 6 T .R . 200. I’i 
at p. 261.
i t  Denman.
10. (1878) L .R . 3 C.P. 316.
11. Ib id ., at p. 318.
12. [1950] 2 All F..R. 727. at p. 732.
13. [1893] 2 Ch. 216.
14. 1953 edition, at p. 877.
i:>. (1891) 35 S .J. 752.
16 (1886) l . r .  i i  r .n  10.
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d ia l an appcarance lias mu Im t ii e n u re d  on behalf o f  (lie  
s l l i p . i t
On the basis of The Hercules it would appear that the most 
certain procedure to effect a sale is to begin an action for the 
charges arising under section 5 of the Liens 011 Goods and 
Chattels A ct,1* and, where the address or whereabouts of the 
bailor is unknown, apph for an order to give notice of the writ b\ 
advertisement under Order 9, rule 2(4). Having obtained such order 
and having advertised in the prescribed manner, the bailee would, 
then, if an appearance were not made, be in a position to applv to 
ihe court pursuant to Order 50, rule 2, and if he supported his ap­
plication with proper affidivits, an order for sale could be obtained.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the law regarding the 
power of sale of gratuitous bailees and other bailees given a lien 
under the Liens on Goods and Chattels Act is defective. A more 
serious dcfect, however, exists in the law regarding most bailees 
for hire. At common law even where money was owing a bailee 
in respect of the bailed goods, he had no right of sale. In certain 
situations, the law allowed a bailee a lien, the most common 
being the innkeepers’ lien,111 the common carriers’ lien-" and the 
lien of a person who has done work 011 an article.-1 But as Grose, 
explains in Hammonds v. Barclay-- a lien is merely
. . .  a right in «»lie 111a 11 to i eta in (hat which is in his possess­
ion belonging to another, till certain demands of him the 
person in possession arc satisfied.
It confers 110 right of action;-* it is mere passive right of detention 
until the debt is paid, and so 110 claim can be made for storage 
or keep24 unless, of course, there is a contract to the contrary. 
Although it was argued in The Thomas Iron Works Company v. 
The Patent Derrick Company25 that such a right of retainer with­
out a power of sale seems of little utility and renders the goods 
subject to the lien utterlv useless to both parties, that is the com­
mon law and, except in cases of necessity, one has to relv 011 
statutorv provisions to obtain a power of sale.
17. Ibid ., at p. II.
18. R .S.N .B., 1952, c. 131.
19. Thom pson v. Lacy  (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 283: 1 (Mi K.R. 667; now codified 
by the Inn-Keepers Act, R .S.N .B ., 1952, c. I l l ,  s. 2.
20. K ushforth  r-. H adfield  (1805), 6 East 519; 102 F..R. 1386.
21. See, for exam ple, K eene v. Thom as  [190.')] 1 K .B. 136; now codified by 
the Liens on Goods and Chattels Act, R.S.N .B., 1952. c. 131. s. 2.
22. (1802) 2 East 227, at p. 235; 102 E .R . 356. at 359.
23. H iggins v. Scott (1831), 2 B. fc Ad. 413: 109 E .R . 1196.
24. Spears v. Hartly  (1880) 3 Esp. 81; 170 E .R . 545.
25. (I860) I J .  & H. 93; 70 E .R . 676.
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No general provision appears in the Liens 011 Goods and 
C hattels Act or elsewhere for granting a lien to bailees for hire, 
let alone a power of sale. This is strange indeed since in the 
Liens 011 Goods and Chattels Act in the Revised Statutes of 
1927, it was provided that
A bailee for hire shall ha\e a particular lien on the goods bailed 
to him by the owner for any charges which may be due the 
bailee under the bailm ent.-*>
Since there appears to be a higher duty imposed on a bailee for 
hire than 011 a gratuitous bailee,27 the former would seem to be 
entitled to a lien more than a gratuitous bailee. Perhaps in pre­
paring the 1952 statute2* the draftsman felt that a bailee for hire 
was entitled to a lien at common law, and, consequently that 
the section in the 1927 Act just quoted wras unnecessary. This is, 
however, not the law'. In the absence of statute2” no lien can be 
exercised in respcct of things delivered but 011 which no work 
is done.30
It is suggested that the Liens 011 Goods and Chattels Act 
should be amended to give a comprehensive power of sale to 
bailees, whether gratuitous or for hire, and whether or not the 
bailee can be located.
Ronald G . Lister
II Law. U .N .B.
26. R.S.N .II.. 1927, c. 164, s. 4 (1).
27. See C.iblin v. McMullen (1869) L .R . 2 P.C. 317; Cf. Wilson v. B ietl 
(1843) II M. fc W . 113; 152 F..R. 737. per R olfc. 11.
28. R .S.N .B.. I9.V2, c. 131.
29. Such as. for exam ple, the exceptions already mentioned appearing in 
the Liens on Coods and Chattels Act, R .S.N .II.. 1952. c. 131 and the 
W arehousem an’s L ien  Act, R .S.N .B ., 1952, c. 247. T h e  latter statute 
may at first sight look fairly broad but it should be noted that by s. 
1 (b) its application is lim ited to persons engaged in the business of 
storage.
30. See H nllon  j 1. Car M aintenance Co.. I.Id. [1915] 1 Ch. 621.
